1 QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT

1.1 INTRODUCTION

This section on Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) aims to provide a systematic analysis of the major risks that may arise from 24 development wells drilling and laying of interconnecting gas pipeline in GGS-1 to trunk pipeline. The QRA process outlines rational evaluations of the identified risks based on their significance and provides the outline for appropriate preventive and risk mitigation measures. Results of the QRA provides valuable inputs into the overall project planning and the decision-making process for effectively addressing the identified risks. This will ensure that the project risks stay below As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) levels at all times during project implementation. In addition, the QRA will also help in assessing risks arising from potential emergency situations like a blow out and develop a structured Emergency Response Plan (ERP) to restrict damage to personnel, infrastructure and the environment.

The risk study for the onshore drilling and testing activities has considered all aspects of operation of the drilling rig and other associated activities during the development phase. Loss of well control / blow-out and process/pipeline leaks constitute the major potential hazards that may be associated with the proposed onshore development and production of oil and natural gas at the identified well locations within the AAP-ON-94/1 block.

The following section describes objectives, methodology of the risk assessment study and then presents the assessment for each of the potential risk separately. This includes identification of major hazards, hazard screening and ranking, frequency and consequence analysis for major hazards. The hazards have subsequently been quantitatively evaluated through a criteria based risk evaluation matrix. Risk mitigation measures to reduce significant risks to acceptable levels have also been recommended as a part of the risk assessment study.

1.2 OBJECTIVE OF THE QRA STUDY

The overall objective of this QRA with respect to the proposed project involves identification and evaluation of major risks, prioritizing risks identified based on their hazard consequences and formulating suitable risk reduction/mitigation measures in line with the ALARP principle. Hence in order to ensure effective management of any emergency situations (with potential individual and societal risks) that may arise during the development drilling activities, following specific objectives need to be achieved.
• Identify potential risk scenarios that may arise out of proposed
development well drilling, operations of gas pipelines and associated
equipment’s, mud chemicals storage and handling etc.
• Analyse the possible likelihood and frequency of such risk scenarios by
reviewing historical accident related data for onshore oil and gas
industries.
• Predict the consequences of such potential risk scenarios and if
consequences are high, establish the same by through application of
quantitative simulations.
• Recommend feasible preventive and risk mitigation measures as well
as provide inputs for drawing up of Emergency Management Plan
(EMP) for the Project.

1.3 **RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY**

The risk assessment process is primarily based on likelihood of occurrence of
the risks identified and their possible hazard consequences particularly being
evaluated through hypothetical accident scenarios. With respect to the
proposed Project, major risks viz. blow outs, pipeline and process leaks, non-
process fires etc. have been assessed and evaluated through a risk matrix
generated to combine the risk severity and likelihood factor. Risk associated
with the well development activities have been determined semi-
quantitatively as the product of likelihood/probability and
severity/consequence by using order of magnitude data (risk ranking =
severity/consequence factor X likelihood/probability factor). Significance of
such project related risks was then established through their classification as
high, medium, low, very low depending upon risk ranking.

The risk matrix is a widely accepted as standardized method of quantitative
risk assessment and is preferred over purely quantitative methods, given that
its inherent limitations to define a risk event is certain. Application of this tool
has resulted in the prioritization of the potential risks events for the drilling
activity thus providing the basis for drawing up risk mitigation measures and
leading to formulation of plans for risk and emergency management. The
overall approach is summarized in the **Figure 1.1**.
1.3.1 Hazard Identification

Hazard identification for the purposes of this QRA comprised of a review of the Project and associated activity related information provided by HOEC. In addition, guidance provided by knowledge platforms/portals of the upstream oil & gas industry including OGP, ITOPF, EGIG and DNV, Norwegian Petroleum Directorate etc. are used to identify potential hazards that can arise out of the proposed Project activities. Taking into account the applicability of different risk aspects in context of the development drilling operations to be undertaken in the identified well locations, there are three major categories of hazards that can be associated with proposed Project which has been dealt with in detail. This includes:

- Blowouts leading to uncontrolled well flow, jet fires;
- Non-process fires / explosions, the release of a dangerous substance or any other event resulting from a work activity which could result in death or serious injury to people within the site;
- Leaks from interconnecting pipeline network/trunk pipeline leading to jet fire; and
- Any event which may result in major damage to the structure of the rig.
Well control incident covers a range of events which have the potential of leading to blow-outs but are generally controlled by necessary technological interventions. Hence, such incidents are considered of minor consequences and as a result not well documented. Other possible hazard scenarios like mud chemical spills, falls, etc. has also not been considered for detailed assessment as preliminary evaluation has indicated that the overall risk that may arise out of them would be low. In addition, it is understood that, causative factors and mitigation measures for such events can be adequately taken care of through exiting safety management procedures and practices of HOEC.

It must also be noted here that many hazards identified are sometimes interrelated with one hazard often having the ability to trigger off another hazard through a domino effect. For example, a large oil spill in most instances is caused by another hazardous incident like a blowout or process leak. This aspect has been considered while drawing up hazard mitigation measures and such linkages (between hazards) has also been given due importance for managing hazards and associated risks in a composite manner through HOEC’s Health, Safety & Environmental Management System (HSEMS) and through the Emergency Management Plan, if a contingency situation so arises.

1.3.2 Frequency Analysis

Frequency analysis involves estimating the likelihood of each of the failure cases identified during the hazard identification stage. The analysis of frequencies of occurrences for the key hazards that has been listed out is important to assess the likelihood of such hazards to actually unfold during the lifecycle of the project. The frequency analysis approach for the proposed Project is based primarily on historical accident frequency data, event tree analysis and judgmental evaluation. Major oil and gas industry information sources viz. statistical data, historical records and global industry experience were considered during the frequency analysis of the major identified risks.

For QRA for the proposed Project, various accident statistics and published oil industry databases have been consulted for arriving at probable frequencies of identified hazards. However, taking into account the absence of representative historical data/statistics with respect to onshore operations, relevant offshore accident databases have been considered in the frequency analysis of identified hazards. The same has been recommended in the “Risk Assessment

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1It is to be noted that the frequency of occurrences are usually obtained by a combination of component probabilities derived on basis of reliability data and /or statistical analysis of historical data.

2Although Alberta Energy & Utilities Board (EUB) maintains a database for onshore incidents for the period 1975-1990 the same has not been considered in the context of the present study as the Alberta wells are believed to be sour with precaution being taken accordingly to minimize the likelihood of release.
Data Directory” published by the International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP). Key databases/reports referred as part of the QRA study includes Worldwide Offshore Accident Databank (WOAD), Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Reports, Norwegian Petroleum Directorate Directives, Offshore Reliability Data (OREDA) Handbook, HSE Offshore Incident Database, SINTEF Offshore Blowout Database etc.

Based on the range of probabilities arrived at for different potential hazards that may be encountered during the proposed well development activities, following criteria for likelihood rankings have been drawn up as presented in the Table 1.1.

### Table 1.1 Frequency Categories and Criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Likelihood Ranking</th>
<th>Criteria Ranking (cases/year)</th>
<th>Frequency Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>&gt;1.0</td>
<td>Frequent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>&gt;10^{-1} to &lt;1.0</td>
<td>Probable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>&gt;10^{-3} to &lt;10^{-1}</td>
<td>Occasional/Rare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>&gt;10^{-5} to &lt;10^{-3}</td>
<td>Not Likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>&gt;10^{-6} to &lt;10^{-5}</td>
<td>Improbable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.3.3 Consequence Analysis

In parallel to frequency analysis, hazard prediction / consequence analysis exercise assesses resulting effects in instances when accidents occur and their likely impact on project personnel, infrastructure and environment. In relation to the proposed Project, estimation of consequences for each possible event has been based either on accident experience, consequence modelling or professional judgment, as appropriate.

Given the high risk perception associated with blow outs in context of onshore drilling operation, a detailed analysis of consequences has been undertaken for blow outs taking into account physical factors and technological interventions. Consequences of such accidental events on the physical, biological and socio-economic environment have been studied to evaluate the potential of the identified risks/hazards. In all, the consequence analysis takes into account the following aspects:

- Nature of impact on environment and community;
- Occupational health and safety;
- Asset and property damage;
- Corporate image
- Timeline for restoration of environmental and property damage
- Restoration cost for environmental and property damage

The following criterion for consequence rankings (Table 1.2) is drawn up in context of the possible consequences of risk events that may occur during proposed well development activities:
Table 1.2  Severity Categories and Criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consequence</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Criteria Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Catastrophic | 5       | - Multiple fatalities/Permanent total disability to more than 50 persons  
|             |         | - Severe violations of national limits for environmental emission  
|             |         | - More than 5 years for natural recovery  
|             |         | - Net negative financial impact of >10 crores  
|             |         | - Long term impact on ecologically sensitive areas  
|             |         | - International media coverage  
|             |         | - National stakeholder concern and media coverage |
| Major       | 4       | - Single fatality/permanent total disability to one or more persons  
|             |         | - Major violations of national limits for environmental emissions  
|             |         | - 2-5 years for natural recovery  
|             |         | - Net negative financial impact of 5-10 crores  
|             |         | - Significant impact on endangered and threatened floral and faunal species  
|             |         | - Loss of corporate image and reputation |
| Moderate    | 3       | - Short term hospitalization & rehabilitation leading to recovery  
|             |         | - Short term violations of national limits for environmental emissions  
|             |         | - 1-2 years for natural recovery  
|             |         | - Net negative financial impact of 1-5 crores  
|             |         | - Short term impact on protected natural habitats  
|             |         | - State wide media coverage |
| Minor       | 2       | - Medical treatment injuries  
|             |         | - 1 year for natural recovery  
|             |         | - Net negative financial impact of 0.5 - 1 crore  
|             |         | - Temporary environmental impacts which can be mitigated  
|             |         | - Local stakeholder concern and public attention |
| Insignificant | 1     | - First Aid treatment with no Lost Time Incidents (LTIs)  
|             |         | - Natural recovery < 1year  
|             |         | - Net negative financial impact of <0.5 crores  
|             |         | - No significant impact on environmental components  
|             |         | - No media coverage |

1.3.4  Risk Evaluation

Based on ranking of likelihood and frequencies, each identified hazard has been evaluated based on the likelihood of occurrence and the magnitude of consequences. Significance of risks is expressed as the product of likelihood and consequence of the risk event, expressed as follows:

\[ \text{Significance} = \text{Likelihood} \times \text{Consequence} \]

The Table 1.3 below illustrates all possible product results for five likelihood and consequence categories while the Table 1.4 assigns risk significance criteria in four regions that identify the limit of risk acceptability. Depending on the position of intersection of a column with a row in the risk matrix,
hazard prone activities have been classified as low, medium and high thereby qualifying a set of risk reduction / mitigation strategies.

Table 1.3  
**Risk Matrix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consequence</th>
<th>Frequent</th>
<th>Probable</th>
<th>Remote</th>
<th>Not Likely</th>
<th>Improbable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catastrophic</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insignificant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.4  
**Risk Criteria and Action Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Significance</th>
<th>Criteria Definition &amp; Action Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High (16 - 25)</td>
<td>“Risk requires attention” – Project HSE Management need to ensure that necessary mitigation are adopted to ensure that possible risk remains within acceptable limits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (10 – 15)</td>
<td>“Risk is tolerable” – Project HSE Management needs to adopt necessary measures to prevent any change/modification of existing risk controls and ensure implementation of all practicable controls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (5 - 9)</td>
<td>“Risk is acceptable” – Project related risks are managed by well-established controls and routine processes/procedures. Implementation of additional controls can be considered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Low (1 - 4)</td>
<td>“Risk is acceptable” – All risks are managed by well-established controls and routine processes/procedures. Additional risk controls need not to be considered</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.4  
**RISK ASSESSMENT OF IDENTIFIED PROJECT HAZARDS**

As already discussed in the previous section, three major categories risk have identified in relation to proposed development drilling activities. A comprehensive risk assessment study has been undertaken to assess and evaluate significance of identified risks in terms of severity of consequences and likelihood of occurrence. Risk assessment study details have been summarized in the subsequent sections below:
**Blow Outs/Loss of Well Control**

Blow out is an uncontrolled release of well fluid (primarily hydrocarbons viz. oil and/or gas and may also include drilling mud, completion fluid, water etc.) from an exploratory or development well. Blow outs are the result of failure to control a kick and regain pressure control and are typically caused by equipment failure or human error. The possible blow out cause events occurring in isolation or in combination have been listed below:

- Formation fluid entry into well bore;
- Loss of containment due to malfunction (viz. wire lining);
- Well head damage (e.g. by fires, storms, dropped object etc.); and
- Rig forced off station (e.g. by anchor failure) damaging Blow Out Preventer (BOP) or wellhead.

The most common cause of blow out can be associated with the sudden/unexpected entry/release of formation fluid into well bore that may arise as a result of the following events as discussed in the Box 1.1 below:

**Box 1.1 Primary Causes of Blow Outs**

**Shallow gas**
In shallow formations there may be pockets of shallow gas. In these instances there is often insufficient mud density in the well and no BOP is in place. If the hole strikes shallow gas the gas may be released on the drilling rig very rapidly. Typical geological features which suggest the presence of shallow gas can then be detected. Historically, striking of shallow gas has been one of the most frequent causes of blowouts in drilling.

**Swabbing**
As the drill pipe is pulled upwards during trips out of the hole or upward movement of the drill string, the pressure in the hole beneath the drill bit is reduced, creating a suction effect. Sufficient drilling mud must be pumped down-hole to compensate for this effect or well fluids may enter the bore. Swabbing is also a frequent cause of drilling blowouts.

**High formation pressure**
Drilling into an unexpected zone of high pressure may allow formation fluids to enter the well before mud weight can be increased to prevent it.

**Insufficient mud weight**
The primary method of well control is the use of drilling mud; in correct operation, the hydrostatic pressure exerted by the mud prevents well fluids from entering the well bore. A high mud weight provides safety against well fluids in-flows. However, a high mud weight reduces drilling speed, therefore, mud weight is calculated to establish weight most suitable to safely control anticipated formation pressures and allows optimum rates of penetration. If the required mud weight is incorrectly calculated then well fluid may be able to enter the bore.

**Lost Circulation**
Drilling mud circulation can be lost if mud enters a permeable formation instead of returning to the rig. This reduces the hydrostatic pressures exerted by the mud throughout the well bore, and may allow well fluids from another formation to enter the bore.

**Gas cut mud**
Drilling fluids are denser than well fluids; this density is required to provide the hydrostatic pressure which prevents well fluids from entering the bore. If well fluids mix with the mud then its density will be reduced. As mud is circulated back to surface, hydrostatic pressure exerted by the mud column is reduced. Once gas reaches surface it is released into the atmosphere.
For better understanding, causes of blow outs have been systematically defined in terms of loss of pressure control (failure of primary barrier), uncontrolled flow of fluid or failure of secondary barrier (BOP). The blow out incidents resulting from primary and secondary failures for proposed operations as obtained through comprehensive root cause analysis of the Gulf Coast (Texas, OCS and US Gulf of Mexico) Blow Outs\textsuperscript{1} during 1960-1996 have been presented in the Table 1.5 below.

**Table 1.5 Blow Out Cause Distribution for Failures during Drilling Operations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl. No.</th>
<th>Causal Factors</th>
<th>Blow Out Incidents (Nos.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td><strong>Primary Barrier</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Swabbing</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Drilling Break</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Formation breakdown</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Trapped/expanding gas</td>
<td>09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Gas cut mud</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Low mud weight</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Wellhead failure</td>
<td>05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Cement setting</td>
<td>05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td><strong>Secondary Barrier</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Failure to close BOP</td>
<td>07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Failure of BOP after closure</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>BOP not in place</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fracture at casing shoe</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Failure to stab string valve</td>
<td>09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Casing leakage</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, underlying blowout causes as discussed in the above table can be primarily attributed to swabbing as the primary barrier failure which is indicative of insufficient attention given to trip margin and controlling pipe movement speed. Also, it is evident from the above table that lack of proper maintenance, operational failures and absence of BOPs as secondary barrier contributed to majority of blowout incidents (approx. 30 nos.) is recorded.

**Blowout Frequency Analysis**

Blow out frequency estimates is obtained from a combination of incident experience and associated exposure in a given area over a given period. For the purpose of calculation of blow out frequency analysis in context of the present study involving developmental drilling, blow out frequencies per well drilled have been considered.

\textsuperscript{1} “Trends extracted from 1200 Gulf Coast blowouts during 1960-1996” – Pal Skalle and A.I. Podio
The blowout frequencies presented in this report are extracted from the latest revision of the Scandpower¹ report and are presented in Table 1.6 below. The blowout probability is determined from blowouts in the North Sea. (i.e. British, Dutch and Norwegian sectors) given comparable data for onshore operations are not readily available.

Table 1.6  
**Blow Out Frequencies Recommended per Drilled Well**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drilling Operation</th>
<th>Well Category</th>
<th>Frequency, gas well</th>
<th>Frequency, oil well</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exploration</td>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>1.12E-04</td>
<td>1.23E-04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wild Cat</td>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>9.70E-05</td>
<td>1.17E-04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appraisal</td>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>1.07E-04</td>
<td>1.30E-04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>2.16E-05</td>
<td>2.62E-05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the aforesaid frequency and information provided by HOEC the blow out frequency for the proposed project has been computed as follows:

No of wells to be drilled per year = 6 (A)

Blow out frequency for development drilling (gas) = 2.16 X 10⁻⁵ per well drilled (B)

Frequency of blow out occurrence for the proposed project (gas) = (A X B) = 6 X 2.16 X 10⁻⁵

= 1.29 X 10⁻⁴ per well drilled

Thus, the blow out frequency for the proposed project for gas wells have been computed to be **1.29 X 10⁻⁴ per well drilled per year** i.e. the likelihood of its occurrence is identified to be as “Not Likely”

**Blowout Ignition Probability**

Review of SINTEF database indicates that a rounded ignition probability of 0.3 has been widely used for the purpose of quantitative risk analysis arising from blow outs. As per this database generally ignition occurred within first 5 minutes in approximately 40% of the blowouts leading to either pool and/or jet fire. Blow out leading to flammable gas release has a greater probability of ignition compared to liquid releases² (Figure 1.2).

---


²Fire and Explosion – Fire Risk Analysis by Daejun Change, Division of Ocean System and Engineering
An alternative to the blowout ignition probabilities given by the UKOOA look-up correlations can be obtained from Scandpowers’s interpretation of the blowout data provided by SINTEF 2. The most significant category is that for deep blowouts which indicates an early ignition probability of 0.09. For the purpose of the QRA study this can be taken as occurring immediately on release and calculation provided below:

\[
\text{No of wells to be drilled per year} = 6 \text{ (A)}
\]

\[
\text{Blow out frequency for development drilling (gas) } = 2.16 \times 10^{-5} \text{ per well drilled (B)}
\]

\[
\text{Blow out ignition probability} = 0.09 \text{ (D)}
\]

\[
\text{Probability of Blow out ignition for the proposed project (gas) } = (A \times B \times D) = 6 \times 2.16 \times 10^{-5} \times 0.09 = 1.16 \times 10^{-5} \approx 0.0011\%
\]

Hence based on the aforesaid calculation the probability of ignition of blow out releases of hydrocarbons for the proposed development project for gas wells is computed to be around \(~0.0011\%\) and can be considered to be as negligible.

**Blowout Consequence Analysis**

Blow out from a hydrocarbon development gas wells with respect to the proposed project may cause jet fires resulting from ignited gas blow outs.
Ignition of Flammable Gas Release leading to Jet Fire

Jet fires are burning jet of gas or sprays of atomized liquids resulting from gas and condensate release from high pressure equipment and blow outs. Jet fires may also result in the release of high pressure liquid containing dissolved gas due to gas flashing off and turning the liquid into a spray of small droplets. In context of the present study, formation of jet fires can be attributed by the high pressure release and ignition of natural gas if encountered during exploration of block hydrocarbon reserves.

Natural gas as recovered from underground deposits primarily contains methane (CH₄) as a flammable component, but it also contains heavier gaseous hydrocarbons such as ethane (C₂H₆), propane (C₃H₈) and butane (C₄H₁₀). Other gases such as CO₂, nitrogen and hydrogen sulfide (H₂S) are also often present. Methane is typically 90 percent, ethane 5-15 percent, propane and butane, up to 5 percent. Thus, considering higher percentage of methane in natural gas, the thermo-chemical properties of the same has been utilized in the jet fire blow out consequence modelling. The following risk scenarios (Table 1.7) have been considered for nature gas release consequence modelling:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Release Rate (kg/s)</th>
<th>Release Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scenario - I</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario - II</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario - III (Worst Case)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Large</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The modelling of nature gas releases has been carried out using ALOHA. A Flammable Level of Concern approach has been utilized for assessing safety risk associated with the release of flammable gases (here methane) from well blow outs. In ALOHA, a flammable Level of Concern (LOC) is a threshold concentration of fuel in the air above which a flammability hazard may exist. While modelling the release of a flammable gas that may catch fire—but which is not currently burning—ALOHA can predict the flammable area of the vapour cloud so that flammability hazard can be established.

The flammable area is the part of a flammable vapor cloud where the concentration is in the flammable range, between the Lower and Upper Explosive Limits (LEL and UEL). These limits are percentages that represent the concentration of the fuel (that is, the chemical vapor) in the air. If the chemical vapor comes into contact with an ignition source (such as a spark), it will burn only if its fuel-air concentration is between the LEL and the UEL—because that portion of the cloud is already pre-mixed to the right mixture of fuel and air for burning to occur. If the fuel-air concentration is below the LEL, there is not enough fuel in the air to sustain a fire or an explosion—it is too
lean. If the fuel-air concentration is above the UEL, there is not enough oxygen to sustain a fire or an explosion because there is too much fuel—it is too rich.

When a flammable vapor cloud is dispersing, the concentration of fuel in the air is not uniform; there will be areas where the concentration is higher than the average and areas where the concentration is lower than the average. This is called concentration patchiness. Because of concentration patchiness, there will be areas (called pockets) where the chemical is in the flammable range even though the average concentration has fallen below the LEL. Because of this, ALOHA's default flammable LOCs are each a fraction of the LEL, rather than the LEL itself. ALOHA uses 60% of the LEL as the default LOC for the red threat zone, because some experiments have shown that flame pockets can occur in places where the average concentration is above that level. Another common threat level used by responders is 10% of the LEL, which is ALOHA's default LOC for the yellow threat zone. The flammable LOC threat zones for methane release are as follows:

Red : 26,400 ppm = 60% LEL = Flame Pockets
Yellow: 4,400 ppm = 10% LEL

Well site risk contour maps for worst case scenario prepared based on ALOHA modeling of natural gas releases for flammable vapour cloud has been presented in Figures 1.3-1.5 below.

Figure 1.3 Scenario I: Risk Contour Map
THREAT ZONE:
Threat Modelled: Flammable Area of Vapor Cloud

Model Run: Gaussian

Red : 25 meters --- (26,400 ppm = 60% LEL = Flame Pockets)

Note: Threat zone was not drawn because effects of near-field patchiness make dispersion predictions less reliable for short distances.

Yellow: 60 meters --- (4,400 ppm = 10% LEL)

Figure 1.4 Scenario II: Risk Contour Map

THREAT ZONE:
Threat Modelled: Flammable Area of Vapor Cloud

Model Run: Gaussian

Red : 55 meters --- (26,400 ppm = 60% LEL = Flame Pockets)

Yellow: 131 meters --- (4,400 ppm = 10% LEL)
Figure 1.5  Scenario III: Risk Contour Map

THREAT ZONE:
Threat Modelled: Flammable Area of Vapour Cloud

Model Run: Gaussian

Red: 77 meters --- (26,400 ppm = 60% LEL = Flame Pockets)

Yellow: 183 meters --- (4,400 ppm = 10% LEL)

The zone of flammable vapour cloud calculated for hypothetical natural gas release under risk scenarios discussed in the earlier sections have been presented in the Table 1.8 below.

Table 1.8  Zone of Flammable Vapour Cloud-Natural Gas Release Scenarion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Release Type</th>
<th>Release Rate (kg/s)</th>
<th>Red -60% LEL (m)</th>
<th>Yellow -10% LEL (m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hence for a worst case scenario (10kg/s) the flammable vapor cloud zone/flame pockets resulting from accidental release of natural gas will be
covering a radial zone of 77m from source with the flammable gas concentration within this zone being 26,400 ppm.

Based on the flammable vapour cloud concentration modelled for the worst case scenario (10 kg/s) an effort was made to establish the overpressure (blast force zone) that may result from delayed ignition of vapour cloud generated from any such accidental release. For overpressure risk modelling using ALOHA a delayed ignition time of 5 minutes was considered of the vapour cloud mass. However the threat modelled revealed that Level of Concern (LOC) was never exceeded that may possibly lead to damage to property or life within the blast radius. The results have been provided in Figure 1.6 below.

**Figure 1.6** Scenario III (Worst Case) – Overpressure Risk Modeling

- Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast force) from vapor cloud explosion
- Time of Ignition: 5 minutes after release begins
- Type of Ignition: ignited by spark or flame
- Level of Congestion: uncongested
- Model Run: Gaussian
- Explosive mass at time of ignition: 188 kilograms
- Red : LOC was never exceeded --- (8.0 psi = destruction of buildings)
- Orange: LOC was never exceeded --- (3.5 psi = serious injury likely)
- Yellow: LOC was never exceeded --- (1.0 psi = shatters glass)

The risk significance for the potential blow out scenario resulting from development drilling has been presented below. For calculating the risk significance, the likelihood ranking is considered to be “2” as the frequency analysis for blow outs incidents is computed at “1.29 X 10⁻⁴” whereas the consequence ranking has been identified to be as “4” given the worst case scenario modelling (blast overpressure) indicates that the LOC was never exceeded leading to multiple fatalities (For criteria ranking please refer to Table 1.1 & 1.2).

**Risk Ranking – Blowout Natural Gas Release (Worst Case Scenario)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Likelihood ranking</th>
<th>Consequence ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Risk Ranking & Significance = 8 i.e. “Low” i.e. Risk is Tolerable and can be managed through implementation of existing controls.

**Hydrocarbons Leaks Due to Loss of Containment While Drilling & Testing**

The releases of hydrocarbons that may be isolated from reservoir fluids include gas releases in the mud return area during drilling. The consequences of gas releases are described in this section. ALOHA model has been used to model the releases from failure of the test separator.
**Frequency Analysis**

Review of the hydrocarbon release database (HCRD) of 2003 for **One North Sea Platform** indicates the process gas leak frequencies for large releases (>10 kg/s) to be about $6.0 \times 10^{-3}$ per year. The same frequency has been considered for potential release from leaks due to loss of containment while drilling.

**Gas Releases during Drilling**

*a) Flash Fire*

If gas is entrained in the mud then it could be released from the mud pits or shakers. The amount of gas returned is unlikely to be so great that a jet fire could occur, but the gas could build up into a flammable vapour cloud in the mud pit area. If the cloud then ignites it will result in a flash fire or vapour cloud explosion. Again, there is also the potential for a toxic cloud to be present if the release is during a period when sour crude is a possibility. The mud return typically contains around 50% water this means it cannot be ignited in liquid form so there is no danger of pool fires. Liquid mud fires are therefore not considered further.

The mud - gas separator can be other source that contains both flammable liquid and gas.

A well test separator rupture could result in release of gas when a gas cloud will form, initially located around the release point. If the release is ignited immediately then a fireball will be formed. If this cloud is not immediately ignited, then a vapour cloud will form, which will disperse with the wind and diluted as a result of air entrainment. The principal hazard arising from a cloud of dispersing flammable material is its subsequent (delayed) ignition, resulting in a flash fire. Large-scale experiments on the dispersion and ignition of flammable gas clouds show that ignition is unlikely when the average concentration is below the lower flammability limit (LFL).

As in the case for blow outs, an effort was made to establish the overpressure (blast force zone) that may result from delayed ignition of vapour cloud generated from any such accidental release. For overpressure risk modelling using ALOHA a delayed ignition time of 5 minutes was considered of the vapour cloud mass. However the threat modelled revealed that Level of Concern (LOC) was never exceeded that may possibly lead to damage to property or life within the blast radius. The results have been provided in [Figure 1.7](#) below.
b) Jet Fire
The term jet fire is used to describe the flame produced due to the ignition of a continuous pressurised leakage from the pipe work. Combustion in a jet fire occurs in the form of a strong turbulent diffusion flame that is strongly influenced by the initial momentum of the release. Flame temperatures for typical jet flames vary from 1600°C for laminar diffusion flames to 2000°C for turbulent diffusion flames. The principal hazards from a jet fire are thermal radiation and the potential for significant knock-on effects, such as equipment failure due to impingement of the jet fire. The thermal radiations distances due to Jet Flame are shown in Figure 1.8 and Figure 1.9 below.

**Figure 1.8** Thermal Radiation Distances of Jet Flame due to Leak of 25 mm size
**Threat Zone:**
Threat Modelled: Thermal radiation from jet fire

Model Run: Gaussian

- Red: < 10 meters --- (10.0 kW/(sq m) = potentially lethal within 60 sec)
- Orange: < 10 meters --- (5.0 kW/(sq m) = 2nd degree burns within 60 sec)
- Yellow: 14 meters --- (2.0 kW/(sq m) = pain within 60 sec)

*Figure 1.9*  
Thermal Radiation Distances of Jet Flame due to Leak of 50 mm size

The zone of thermal radiation calculated for hypothetical release and ignition of natural gas during well testing have been presented in the *Table 1.9* below.
### Thermal Radiation Zone - NG Release Scenario during Well Testing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Release Type</th>
<th>Red (kW/sqm)</th>
<th>Orange (kW/sqm)</th>
<th>Yellow (kW/sqm)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leak of 25 mm size</td>
<td>&lt;10</td>
<td>&lt;10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leak of 50 mm size</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hence for a worst case scenario (50 mm leak) the ignition of natural gas release will be resulting in generation of thermal radiation which will be lethal within a maximum radius of 10m within 1 minute of its occurrence.

The risk significance for the potential well release scenario resulting from exploratory drilling has been presented below. For calculating the risk significance, the likelihood ranking is considered to be “3” as the frequency analysis for loss of containment is computed at “>1 x 10^{-3}” whereas the consequence ranking has been identified to be as “3” given the worst case scenario modelling (blast overpressure)/jet fire indicates that the LOC was never exceeded leading to multiple fatalities (For criteria ranking please refer to Table 1.1 & 1.2).

**Risk Ranking – Jet Fire/Blast Overpressure from Well Releases (Worst Case Scenario)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Likelihood ranking</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>Consequence ranking</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Risk Ranking & Significance = 9 i.e. “Low” i.e. Risk is Tolerable and can be managed through implementation of existing controls and technologies.**

### Interconnecting Hydrocarbon Pipeline Network

As discussed in the project description section, the following gas pipelines will be laid:

- Pipeline-1: 5.5 km from GGS to Trunk pipeline of 12 inch dia
- Pipeline-2: 8.8 km pipeline from GPP to IOCL Terminal of 12 inch dia

The failure of the aforesaid gas pipeline may lead to the following hazards:

- Jet fires associated with pipework failures;
- Vapour cloud explosions; and
- Flash fires.

Each of these hazards has been described below.

**Jet Fire**

Jet fires result from ignited releases of pressurized flammable gas or superheated/pressurized liquid. The momentum of the release carries the material forward in a long plume entraining air to give a flammable mixture. Jet fires only occur where the natural gas is being handled under pressure or when handled in gas phase and the releases are unobstructed.
**Flash Fire**

Vapour clouds can be formed from the release of vapour of pressurized flammable material as well as from non-flashing liquid releases where vapour clouds can be formed from the evaporation of liquid pools or leakage/rupture of pressurized pipelines transporting flammable gas.

Where ignition of a release does not occur immediately, a vapour cloud is formed and moves away from the point of origin under the action of the wind. This drifting cloud may undergo delayed ignition if an ignition source is reached, resulting in a flash fire if the cloud ignites in an unconfined area or vapour cloud explosion (VCE) if within confined area.

**Vapour Cloud Explosion**

If the generation of heat in a fire involving a vapour-air mixture is accompanied by the generation of pressure then the resulting effect is a vapour cloud explosion (VCE). The amount of overpressure produced in a VCE is determined by the reactivity of the gas, the strength of the ignition source, the degree of confinement of the vapour cloud, the number of obstacles in and around the cloud and the location of the point of ignition with respect to the escape path of the expanding gases.

However, in the case of the interconnecting gas pipeline network jet fire has been identified as the most probable hazard.

**Pipeline Frequency Analysis**

An effort has also been made to understand the primary failure frequencies of pressurised gas/oil to be transported through the interconnecting pipeline network. Based on the European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (EGIG) database the evolution of the primary failure frequencies over the entire period and for the last five years has been provided in Table 1.10 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>No. of Incidents</th>
<th>Total System Exposure (km.yr)</th>
<th>Primary failure frequency (1000 km.yr)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970-2007</td>
<td>1173</td>
<td>3.15x10^6</td>
<td>0.372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-2010</td>
<td>1249</td>
<td>3.55x10^6</td>
<td>0.351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-2013</td>
<td>1309</td>
<td>3.98x10^6</td>
<td>0.329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-2013</td>
<td>1179</td>
<td>3.84x10^6</td>
<td>0.307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-2013</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>3.24x10^6</td>
<td>0.249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-2013</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>2.40x10^6</td>
<td>0.177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2013</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>1.33x10^6</td>
<td>0.157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2013</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>0.70x10^6</td>
<td>0.158</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 9th EGIG Report
As referred in the above table the overall failure frequency (0.33) of the entire period (1970-2013) is slightly lower than the failure frequency of 0.35 reported in the 8th EGIG report (1970-2010). The failure frequency of the last 5 years was found to be 0.16 per 1000km.year, depicting an improved performance over the recent years.

**Incident Causes**

Gas pipeline failure incidents can be attributed to the following major causes viz. external interference, construction defects, corrosion (internal & external), ground movement and hot tap. The distribution of incidents with cause has been presented in the Figure 1.10 below.

**Figure 1.10 Gas Pipeline Failure – Distribution of Incident & Causes**

The interpretation of the aforesaid figure indicated external interference as the major cause of pipeline failure contributing to about 48.4% of the total failure incidents followed by construction defects (16.7%) and corrosion related problems (16.1%). Ground movement resulting from seismic disturbance, landslides, flood etc. contributed to only 7.4% of pipeline failure incident causes.

Review of the 9th EGIG report indicates that primary failure frequency varies with pipeline diameter, and the same has been presented in Table 1.11 below.

**Table 1.11 Primary Failure Frequency based on Diameter Class (1970-2013)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nominal Diameter (inch)</th>
<th>Primary failure frequency (per km.yr)</th>
<th>Pinhole/Crack</th>
<th>Hole</th>
<th>Rupture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>diameter &lt; 5&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.45 X 10^-4</td>
<td>2.68 X 10^-4</td>
<td>1.33 X 10^-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5&quot; ≤ diameter &lt; 11&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.80 X 10^-4</td>
<td>1.97 X 10^-4</td>
<td>6.40 X 10^-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11&quot; ≤ diameter &lt; 17&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.27 X 10^-4</td>
<td>0.98 X 10^-4</td>
<td>4.10 X 10^-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17&quot; ≤ diameter &lt; 23&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.02 X 10^-4</td>
<td>5.00 X 10^-5</td>
<td>3.40 X 10^-5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The pipeline failure frequency viz. leaks or rupture for the natural gas pipeline has been computed based on the aforesaid table. Considering the gas pipeline to be laid for the proposed project has a dia of 12 inches, the failure frequency has been presented in Table 1.12 below.

### Table 1.12  Interconnecting Pipeline - Failure Frequency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl. No</th>
<th>Pipeline Failure Case</th>
<th>EGG Failure Frequency (per km.year)</th>
<th>Pipeline Dia (mm)</th>
<th>Avg. Pipeline Length (km)</th>
<th>Project Pipeline Failure Frequency (per year)</th>
<th>Pipeline Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Pipeline Rupture</td>
<td>4.10 X 10^{-5}</td>
<td>304.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>2.25 x 10^{-4}</td>
<td>Not Likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Pipeline Leak</td>
<td>1.27 X 10^{-4}</td>
<td>304.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.98 x 10^{-4}</td>
<td>Not Likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Pipeline Rupture</td>
<td>4.10 X 10^{-5}</td>
<td>304.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>3.28 x 10^{-4}</td>
<td>Not Likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Pipeline Leak</td>
<td>1.27 X 10^{-4}</td>
<td>304.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>1.01 x 10^{-3}</td>
<td>Occasional/Rare</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus the probability of pipeline leak and rupture with respect to the interconnecting hydrocarbon pipeline network is primarily identified to be as “Not Likely”.

### Pipeline Failure – Ignition Probability

The ignition probability of natural gas pipeline failure (rupture & leaks) with respect to the proposed expansion project is derived based on the following equations as provided in the IGEM/TD/2 standard

\[
P_{\text{ign}} = \begin{cases} 
0.0555 + 0.0137pd^2; & \text{for } 0 \leq pd^2 \leq 57 \\
0.81; & \text{for } pd^2 > 57 
\end{cases} 
\]

\[
P_{\text{ign}} = \begin{cases} 
0.0555 + 0.0137(0.5pd^2); & \text{for } 0 \leq 0.5pd^2 \leq 57 \\
0.81; & \text{for } 0.5pd^2 > 57 
\end{cases} 
\]

**Where:**

- \(P_{\text{ign}}\) = Probability of ignition
- \(p\) = Pipeline operating pressure (bar)
- \(d\) = Pipeline diameter (m)
The ignition and jet fire probability of natural gas release from a leak/rupture of interconnected pipeline network is calculated based on the above equations and presented in Table 1.13 below.

**Table 1.13 Interconnecting Pipeline – Ignition & Jet Fire Probability**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl. No</th>
<th>Pipeline Failure Case</th>
<th>Pipeline Dia (mm)</th>
<th>EGIG Pipeline Failure Frequency (per year)</th>
<th>Ignition Probability</th>
<th>Jet Fire Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Pipeline Rupture</td>
<td>304.8</td>
<td>4.10 X 10^{-5}</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>3.11 x 10^{-6}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Pipeline Leak</td>
<td>304.8</td>
<td>1.27 X 10^{-4}</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>8.32 x 10^{-6}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hence from the above table it can be concluded that ignition probability of natural gas that may be released from the project related proposed gas pipelines due to any accidental event is mostly considered to be “**Improbable**”.

**Consequence Analysis – Pipelines & GCS**

Pipelines generally contains large inventories of oil or gas under high pressure; although accidental releases from them are remote they have the potential of catastrophic or major consequences if related risks are not adequately analysed or controlled. The consequences of possible pipeline failure is generally predicted based on the hypothetical failure scenario considered and defining parameters such as meteorological conditions (stability class), leak hole & rupture size and orientation, pipeline pressure & temperature, physicochemical properties of chemicals released etc.

In case of pipe rupture containing highly flammable natural gas, an immediate ignition will cause a jet fire. Flash fires can result from the release of natural gas through the formation of a vapour cloud with delayed ignition and a fire burning through the cloud. A fire can then flash back to the source of the leak and result in a jet fire. Flash fires have the potential for offsite impact as the vapour clouds can travel considerable distances downwind of the source. Explosions can occur when a flammable gas cloud in a confined area is ignited; however where vapour cloud concentration of released material is lower than Lower Flammability Limit (LFL), consequently the occurrence of a VCE is highly unlikely. VCE, if occurs may result in overpressure effects that become more significant as the degree of confinement increases (Refer Figure 1.11). Therefore, in the present study, only the risks of jet fires for the below scenarios have been modelled and calculated.
Figure 1.11  
**Natural Gas Release – Potential Consequences**

![Diagram of gas release consequences]


Based on the above discussion and frequency analysis as discussed in the earlier section, the following hypothetical risk scenarios (Refer **Table 1.14**) have been considered for consequence analysis of the interconnecting pipelines.

**Table 1.14  Interconnecting Pipeline Risk Modelling Scenarios**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Pipeline dia (mm)</th>
<th>Accident Scenario</th>
<th>Design Pressure (bar)</th>
<th>Pipeline length (km)</th>
<th>Potential Risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Pipeline</td>
<td>304.8</td>
<td>Leak of 50mm dia</td>
<td>17.23</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Jet Fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Pipeline</td>
<td>304.8</td>
<td>Complete rupture</td>
<td>17.23</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Jet Fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Pipeline</td>
<td>304.8</td>
<td>Leak of 50mm dia</td>
<td>17.23</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>Jet Fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Pipeline</td>
<td>304.8</td>
<td>Complete rupture</td>
<td>17.23</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>Jet Fire</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The pipeline failure risk scenarios have been modeled using ALOHA and interpreted in terms of Thermal Radiation Level of Concern (LOC) encompassing the following threshold values (measured in kilowatts per square meter) for natural gas (comprising of ~95% methane1) to create the default threat zones:

**Red:** 10 kW/ (sq. m) -- potentially lethal within 60 sec;

**Orange:** 5 kW/ (sq. m) -- second-degree burns within 60 sec; and

**Yellow:** 2 kW/ (sq. m) -- pain within 60 sec.

For vapour cloud explosion, the following threshold level of concern has been interpreted in terms of blast overpressure as specified below:

---

1 https://www.naesb.org//pdf2/wqj_bps100605w2.pdf
Red: 8.0 psi – destruction of buildings;
Orange: 3.5 psi – serious injury likely; and
Yellow: 1.0 psi – shatters glass

The risk scenarios modelled for pipeline failure has been presented below:

*Scenario 1: 5.5km Pipeline Leak (50mm dia)*

The jet fire threat zone plot for release and ignition of natural gas from 5.5km long pipeline leak of 50mm dia is represented in *Figure 1.12* below.

*Figure 1.12  Threat Zone Plot – 5.5km pipeline leak (50mm dia)*

Source: ALOHA

**THREAT ZONE:**

Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from jet fire

Red : 14 meters --- (10.0 kW/ (sq. m) = potentially lethal within 60 sec)
Orange: 20 meters --- (5.0 kW/ (sq. m) = 2nd degree burns within 60 sec)
Yellow: 30 meters --- (2.0 kW/ (sq. m) = pain within 60 sec)

The worst hazard for release and ignition of natural gas from 5.5km long pipeline leak of 50mm dia will be experienced to a maximum radial distance of 14m from the source with potential lethal effects within 1 minute.
Scenario 2: 5.5km Pipeline Complete Rupture
The jet fire threat zone plot for release and ignition of natural gas from 5.5km long pipeline rupture is represented in Figure 1.13 below.

**Figure 1.13**  *Threat Zone Plot – 5.5km pipeline complete rupture*

![Threat Zone Plot](image)

Source: ALOHA

**THREAT ZONE:**

Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from jet fire

Red : 41 meters --- (10.0 kW/ (sq. m) = potentially lethal within 60 sec)
Orange: 60 meters --- (5.0 kW/ (sq. m) = 2nd degree burns within 60 sec)
Yellow: 94 meters --- (2.0 kW/ (sq. m) = pain within 60 sec)

The worst hazard for release and ignition of natural gas from the complete rupture of 5.5km long gas pipeline will be experienced to a maximum radial distance of 41m from the source with potential lethal effects within 1 minute.
**Scenario 3: 8km Pipeline Leak (50mm dia)**

The jet fire threat zone plot for release and ignition of natural gas from 8km long pipeline leak of 50mm dia is represented in *Figure 1.14* below.

*Figure 1.14 Threat Zone Plot –8km pipeline leak (50mm dia)*

![Threat Zone Plot](image)

Source: ALOHA

**THREAT ZONE:**

Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from jet fire

Red : 14 meters --- (10.0 kW/ (sq. m) = potentially lethal within 60 sec)

Orange: 20 meters --- (5.0 kW/ (sq. m) = 2nd degree burns within 60 sec)

Yellow: 30 meters --- (2.0 kW/ (sq. m) = pain within 60 sec)

The worst hazard for release and ignition of natural gas from 8km long pipeline leak of 50mm dia will be experienced to a maximum radial distance of 14m from the source with potential lethal effects within 1 minute.
Scenario 4: 8km Pipeline Complete Rupture

The jet fire threat zone plot for release and ignition of natural gas from 8km long pipeline rupture is represented in Figure 1.15 below.

**Figure 1.15 Threat Zone Plot – 8km pipeline complete rupture**

![Threat Zone Plot – 8km pipeline complete rupture](image)

Source: ALOHA

**THREAT ZONE:**

Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from jet fire

Red : 42 meters --- (10.0 kW/ (sq. m) = potentially lethal within 60 sec)
Orange: 61 meters --- (5.0 kW/ (sq. m) = 2nd degree burns within 60 sec)
Yellow: 96 meters --- (2.0 kW/ (sq. m) = pain within 60 sec)

The worst hazard for release and ignition of natural gas from the complete rupture of 8km long gas pipeline will be experienced to a maximum radial distance of 42m from the source with potential lethal effects within 1 minute.
For VCE modelled for catastrophic failure of the proposed project gas pipeline the LOC level was never exceeded

THREAT ZONE:

Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast force) from vapor cloud explosion
Type of Ignition: ignited by spark or flame
Level of Congestion: uncongested
Model Run: Heavy Gas

Red : LOC was never exceeded --- (8.0 psi = destruction of buildings)
Orange: LOC was never exceeded --- (3.5 psi = serious injury likely)
Yellow: LOC was never exceeded --- (1.0 psi = shatters glass)

For calculating the risk significance of natural gas pipeline, the likelihood ranking is considered to be “3” as the probability of pipeline rupture is computed to be ~10^-4 per year; whereas the consequence ranking has been identified to be as “3” as given for a worst-case scenario (rupture) lethal effects is likely to be limited within a radial zone of ~42m. Further as discussed in the earlier section, adequate number of gas leak and fire detection system of appropriate design will be provided for the interconnecting pipeline network including GCS to prevent for any major risk at an early stage of the incident.

Risk Ranking – Pipeline Rupture (Worst Case Scenario)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Likelihood ranking</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>Consequence ranking</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Risk Ranking &amp; Significance = 9 i.e. &quot;Low&quot; i.e. Risk is Tolerable and can be managed through implementation of existing controls and technologies.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hazardous Material Releases or Mishaps

Release of following materials are not considered as major accidents and therefore are not quantified in terms of frequency, consequence and the resulting risk.

- Diesel fuel;
- Lubricants;
- Mud Chemicals;
- Explosives.

Exposure to such hazards would be occupational rather than major hazards.

External Hazards

External hazards which may impair the safety of the rig include the following:

- Severe weather conditions;
- Earthquake or ground movement; and
- Security breaches.
Extreme weather conditions are primarily lightening, cyclones and high winds and heavy rains. They may result in injury (through slips trips of personnel) or equipment damage. Cyclones and high winds may damage the rig structure. There are potential hazards to workers from direct impact of the structure i.e. falling equipment and any subsequent hydrocarbon releases caused by equipment damage. However, no fatalities are expected from such conditions i.e. the risk to workers is low, providing:

- Reliable weather forecasts are available;
- Work or rig move is suspended if conditions become too severe;
- Design and operational limits of the rig structure are known and not exceeded.

Other natural hazards, such as earthquake are predominant in Assam region. The risk of external hazards causing blowouts has been considered in the frequency estimation of oil and gas blowouts in the earlier sections.

1.5 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

1.5.1 Objective

Disaster Management is a process or strategy that is implemented when any type of catastrophic event takes place. The Disaster Management Plan envisages the need for providing appropriate action so as to minimize loss of life/property and for restoration of normalcy within the minimum time in event of any emergency. Adequate manpower, training and infrastructure are required to achieve this.

The objectives of Disaster Management Plan are as follows:

- Rapid control and containment of the hazardous situation;
- Minimising the risk and impact of occurrence and its catastrophic effects;
- Effective rehabilitation of affected persons and prevention of damage to Property and environment;
- To render assistance to outside the factory.

The following important elements in the disaster management plan (DMP) are suggested to effectively achieve the objectives of emergency planning:

- Reliable and early detection of an emergency and careful response;
- The command, co-ordination, and response organization structure along with efficient trained personnel;
- The availability of resources for handling emergencies;
- Appropriate emergency response actions;
- Effective notification and communication facilities;
- Regular review and updating of the DMP;
• Proper training of the concerned personnel.

1.5.2 Emergency Response - Organizational Structure

HOEC will constitute emergency response teams to respond to Environmental issues, fire, accidents and technical emergencies. These teams will be made up from operations personnel, who can be called upon 24 hours a day, supported by senior management field personnel as and when required. The emergency response teams will receive specific training for their roles and exercised on a regular basis.

The emergency response set-up is categorized into
• Emergency Response Group (ERG) members
• Emergency Management Team (EMT) members

The Emergency Response Group (ERG) is the field-based team, which activates the emergency response immediately on realizing the emergency. The ERG is organized as:
• Emergency Response Group (ERG) leader
• Forward Controller (FC)
• Incident Controller (IC)
• Emergency Response Team (ERT) members
• Rig HSE Engineer
• Event logger (to be appointed by Rig Manager as per requirement)

The Drilling Supervisor shall be the Emergency Response Group (ERG) leader located at drilling Rig site. The Drilling Rig Manager shall presume the role of ‘Forward Controller’ (FC). The Tool Pusher shall presume the role of ‘Incident Controller’ (IC) and shall be at the scene of the incident along with his team members, to control the emergency. The Forward Controller shall be located at the Rig control room. He shall direct and advise the Incident Controller (IC) on the course of action to be taken in consultation with Drilling Supervisor. The Incident Controller will be present at the scene of emergency and will be the person in the field responsible to control the emergency. He will report the situation to the Forward Controller and to the Drilling Supervisor (ERG leader). The Drilling Supervisor and the Forward Controller (FC) shall constantly update the Drilling Superintendent who in turn updates the other members of the Emergency Management Team (EMT) at Chennai Head Quarters.

The Emergency Management Team (EMT) shall comprise of the following members:
• Managing Director (Emergency Response Manager)
• Drilling Manager (EMT Leader)
• Drilling Superintendent
• Logistics In-charge
• Project Office In-Charge Assam
• HSE Manager
• Drilling Administrator

Once the emergency message is received from the Rig, the Drilling Superintendent shall inform to Drilling Manager who in turn after discussion with the Emergency Response Manager Managing Director and the team at Chennai (if necessary) will activate the Emergency Management Teams (EMT) to the Emergency Control Room.

The organizational chart for emergency response is presented in Figure 1.16 below

**Figure 1.16 Emergency Response Organizational Chart**

![Emergency Response Organizational Chart](image)

1.5.3 Emergency Identified

Emergencies that may arise:

- Such an occurrence may result in on-site implications like:
  - Fire or explosion;
  - Leakage of natural gas; and
  - Oil spillage and subsequent fire.
- Incidents having off-site implications can be:
  - Natural calamities like earthquake, cyclone, lightening, etc.
• Other incidents, which can also result in a disaster, are:
  o Agitation / forced entry by external group of people;
  o Sabotage.

1.5.4 Emergency Classification

Due consideration is given to the severity of potential emergency situation that may arise as a result of accident events as discussed in the Risk Analysis (RA) study. Not all emergency situations call for mobilization of same resources or emergency actions and therefore, the emergencies are classified into three levels depending on their severity and potential impact, so that appropriate emergency response procedures can be effectively implemented by the Emergency Response Team. The emergency levels/tiers defined with respect to this project based on their severity have been discussed in the subsequent sections with 'decision tree' for emergency classification being depicted in Figure 1.17.

Figure 1.17 Emergency Classification "Decision Tree"

The emergency situations have been classified in three categories depending upon their magnitude and consequences. Different types of emergencies that may arise at the project site can be broadly classified as:
Level 1 Emergency

The emergency situation arising in any section of one particular plant / area which is minor in nature, can be controlled within the affected section itself, with the help of in-house resources available at any given point of time. The emergency control actions are limited to level 1 emergency organization only. But such emergency does not have the potential to cause serious injury or damage to property / environment and the domino effect to other section of the affected plant or nearby plants/ areas.

Level 2 Emergency

The emergency situation arising in one or more plants / areas which has the potential to cause serious injury or damage to property / environment within the affected plant or to the nearby plants / areas. This level of emergency situation will not affect surrounding community beyond the power plant facility. But such emergency situation always warrants mobilizing the necessary resources available in-house and/or outsources to mitigate the emergency. The situation requires declaration of On – Site emergency.

Level 3 Emergency

The emergency is perceived to be a kind of situation arising out of an incident having potential threat to human lives and property not only within the power plant facility but also in surrounding areas and environment. It may not be possible to control such situations with the resources available within HOEC facility. The situation may demand prompt response of multiple emergency response groups as have been recognized under the off-site district disaster management plan of the concerned district(s).

Preventive and Mitigation Measures for Blow Outs

Blowouts being events which may be catastrophic to any well operation, it is essential to take up as much preventive measures as feasible. This includes:

- Necessary active barriers (eg., Well-designed Blowout Preventer) be installed to control or contain a potential blowout.
- Weekly blow out drills be carried out to test reliability of BOP and preparedness of drilling team.
- Close monitoring of drilling activity be done to check for signs of increasing pressure, like from shallow gas formations.
- Installation of hydrocarbon detectors.
- Periodic monitoring and preventive maintenance be undertaken for primary and secondary barriers installed for blow out prevention, including third party inspection & testing.
- An appropriate Emergency Response Plan be finalized and implemented by HOEC.
- Marking of hazardous zone (500 meters) around the well site and monitoring of human movements in the zone.
- Training and capacity building exercises/programs be carried out for onsite drilling crew on potential risks associated with exploratory drilling and their possible mitigation measures.
- Installation of mass communication and public address equipment.
- Good layout of well site and escape routes.

Additionally, HOEC will be adopting and implementing the following Safe Operating Procedures (SOPs) developed as part of its Onsite Emergency Response Plan to prevent and address any blow out risks that may result during drilling and work over activities:

- Blow Out Control Equipment
- Choke lines and Choke Manifold Installation with Surface BOP
- Kill Lines and Kill Manifold Installation with Surface BOP
- Control System for Surface BOP stacks
- Testing of Blow Out Prevention Equipment
- BOP Drills.

**Preventive Measures for Handling of Natural Gas**

- Leak detection sensors to be located at areas prone to fire risk/leakages;
- All safety and firefighting requirements as per OISD norms to be put in place;
- High temperature and high pressure alarm with auto-activation of water sprinklers as well as safety relief valve to be provided;
- Flame proof electrical fittings to be provided for the installation;
- Periodical training/awareness to be given to work force at the project site to handle any emergency situation;
- Periodic mock drills to be conducted so as to check the alertness and efficiency and corresponding records to be maintained;
- Signboards including emergency phone numbers and ‘no smoking’ signs should be installed at all appropriate locations;
- Plant shall have adequate communication system;
- Pipeline route/equipment should be provided with smoke/fire detection and alarm system. Fire alarm and firefighting facility commensurate with the storage should be provided at the unloading point;
- ‘No smoking zone’ to be declared at all fire prone areas. Non sparking tools should be used for any maintenance; and
- Wind socks to be installed to check the wind direction at the time of accident and accordingly persons may be diverted towards opposite direction of wind.
Preventive Measures for Interconnecting Pipeline Risk Management

- Design all pipes to cope with maximum expected pressure;
- Install pressure transmitters that remotely monitor high- and low-pressure alarms;
- Design equipment to withstand considerable heat load;
- Conduct regular patrols and inspections of pipeline easements;
- Fit pumps with automatic pump shutdown or other safety devices;
- Minimise enclosed spaces where flammable gas may accumulate;
- Where necessary, automate emergency shutdown systems at production facilities;
- Consider installing flow and pressure instrumentation to transmit upset conditions and plant shutdown valves status;
- Install fire and gas detection systems;
- Implement security controls;
- Install emergency shutdown buttons on each production facility;
- Bury gathering lines at a minimum depth of 600 mm and where above ground, maintain a clear area;
- Implement management of change processes; and
- Conduct pressure testing and inspection of equipment and pipelines.

Preventing Fire and Explosion Hazards

- Proper marking to be made for identification of locations of flammable storages;
- Provision of secondary containment system for all fuel and lubricating oil storages;
- Provision of fire and smoke detectors at potential sources of fire and smoke;
- Storing flammables away from ignition sources and oxidizing materials;
- Providing specific worker training in handling of flammable materials, and in fire prevention or suppression;
- Equipping facilities with fire detectors, alarm systems, and fire-fighting equipment;
- Fire and emergency alarm systems that are both audible and visible;
- For safety of people the building, regulations concerning fire safety to be followed. Some of the requirements include:
  - Installation of fire extinguishers all over the building;
  - Provision of water hydrants in operative condition;
  - Emergency exit;
  - Proper labelling of exit and place of fire protective system installation;
  - Conducting mock drills;
  - Trained personnel to use fire control systems.
General Health and Safety

- The facility will adopt a total safety control system, which aims to prevent the probable accidents such as fire accidents or chemical spills.
- Fire fighting system, such as sprinklers system, portable extinguishers (such as CO2) and automated fire extinguishers shall be provided at strategic locations with a clear labelling of the extinguisher so the type of the extinguisher is easily identifiable. Also a main hydrant around the buildings will be available. On all floors an automated fire detection system will be in place.
- The site operations manager will take steps to train all emergency team members and shall draw up an action plan and identify members. The appointed emergency controller shall act as the in-charge at the site of the incident to control the entire operation.
- The staff shall be trained for first-aid and firefighting procedures. The rescue team shall support the first-aid and firefighting team.
- A first-aid medical centre will be onsite to stabilise the accident victim. The emergency team will make contact with a nearby hospital for further care, if required.
- A training and rehearsal of the emergency response by emergency team members and personnel on site will be done regularly.
- A safe assembly area will be identified and evacuation of the premises will be practised regularly through mock drills.
- In case an emergency is being declared, the situation shall be reported to the authorities such as local police, the chief inspector of factories and the state pollution control board as per rules and regulation of law of the land.
- Safety manual for storage and handling of Hazardous chemicals shall be prepared.
- All the personnel at the site shall be made aware about the hazardous substance stored and risk associated with them.
- Personnel engaged in handling of hazardous chemicals shall be trained to respond in an unlikely event of emergencies.
- A written process safety information document shall be compiled for general use and summary of it shall be circulated to concerned personnel.
- MSDS shall be made available and displayed at prominent places in the facility. The document compilation shall include an assessment of the hazards presented including (i) toxicity information (ii) permissible exposure limits. (iii) Physical data (iv) thermal and chemical stability data (v) reactivity data (vi) corrosivity data (vii) safe procedures in process.
- Safe work practices shall be developed to provide for the control of hazards during operation and maintenance.
- In the material storage area, hazardous materials shall be stored based on their compatibility characteristics.
- Near miss and accident reporting system shall be followed and corrective measures shall be taken to avoid / minimize near miss incidents.
- Safety measures in the form of DO and Don’t Do shall be displayed at strategic locations.
- Safety audits shall be conducted regularly.
- Firefighting system shall be tested periodically for proper functioning.
- All hydrants, monitors and valves shall be visually inspected every month.
- Disaster Management Plan shall be prepared and available with concerned personnel department.

**Personal Protective Equipment**

In certain circumstances, personal protection of the individual maybe required as a supplement to other preventive action. It should not be regarded as a substitute for other control measures and must only be used in conjunction with substitution and elimination measures. PPEs must be appropriately selected individually fitted and workers trained in their correct use and maintenance. PPEs must be regularly checked and maintained to ensure that the worker is being protected.

**First Aid**

First aid procedures and facilities relevant to the needs of the particular workforce should be laid down and provided in consultation with an occupational physician or other health professional.

Health assessment should form a part of a comprehensive occupational health and safety strategy. Where employees have to undergo health assessment, there should be adequate consultation prior to the introduction of such program. Medical records should be kept confidential. Site should be able to relate employee health and illness data to exposure levels in the workplace.